Internalization Through Socialization by Koh, Harold Hongju





HAROLD HONGJU KOH† 
Professors Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks have authored an 
important paper and have begun an important project: how the 
process of internalization of international law into national behavior 
transpires through the process of “socialization.” That project 
continues their important joint work on the Institutional Theory of 
Sovereignty1 by sketching an ambitious outline of an integrated model 
of social mechanisms that influence state behavior. In this comment, 
let me explain first, why the project and this paper are important; and 
second, how their project could be strengthened in the years ahead.  
Until quite recently, the enterprise of International Legal 
Scholarship had long been viewed as a complex oxymoron: like the 
“Holy Roman Empire,” which, of course, was neither Holy, Roman, 
nor an Empire, or the “New York Giants,” who are neither New, 
from New York, or Giants. Similarly, many domestic lawyers had 
assumed that if the subject was “international,” there could be no law 
involved, and if the subject was “international law,” there could be no 
scholarship involved. 
All that changed less than two decades ago, when international 
law finally met international relations theory.2 Unlike many other 
areas of legal scholarship, international law was a relative latecomer 
to interdisciplinarity; the field only became interdisciplinary about 
fifteen years ago, not coincidentally about the time that the collapse 
of the Berlin Wall signaled the new functionality of international law 
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 1. See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 1749, 1750 (2003) (proposing “a sociological model of sovereignty” stemming 
from their “systematic reexamination” of the “questionable empirical assumptions about the 
nature of the state and its relation to the international order”). 
 2. For a review of the evolution of this collaboration, see generally FOUNDATIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS (Oona A. Hathaway & Harold Hongju Koh eds., 2004). 
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rules. As Goodman and Jinks’s article recognizes, the first generation 
of interdisciplinary international law/international relations work 
predictably adopted political science as the “other discipline,” 
invoking rational choice theory as the exemplar of what constitutes 
political science. But over time, that interdisciplinary dialogue shifted. 
A whole range of international relations theories, drawn primarily 
from the schools of political science and political economy, were 
imported into the essentially doctrinal, “old legal process” approach 
of international legal scholarship.3 The main challenge to rationalist 
thought during this period came from the constructivist, “ideational” 
school of international relations theory, typified by the work of such 
constructivist political science scholars as Professors John Gerard 
Ruggie, Alexander Wendt, Kathryn Sikkink, and Martha Finnemore.4 
The lead dialectic arose between “interest-based theories”—those 
theories that take state interests as givens—and “idea-based” 
theories—those theories that take state interests as constructed 
socially through the influence of ideas. This dialectic led to the now-
familiar, but increasingly tired, dichotomy between realists and 
constructivists, with the former group tending to believe that 
international law promotes compliance primarily by relying on 
techniques of coercion and the latter group suggesting that 
compliance grows more fundamentally from techniques of persuasion 
resting on the power of norms.5 
Goodman and Jinks’s paper takes this first-generation scholarship 
as a given, and moves deeper, thus constituting a leading example of 
what may now be fairly called “Second-Generation” International 
Law/International Relations scholarship. Goodman and Jinks’s 
 
 3. For a compressed intellectual history, see Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal 
Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 186–94 (1996) (comparing the history of domestic legal process 
scholarship with international legal process scholarship). 
 4. See generally MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL 
SOCIETY (1996); MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: 
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998); ALEXANDER E. WENDT, SOCIAL 
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1999); Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, 
International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887 (1998); Martha 
Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in 
International Relations and Comparative Politics, 4 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 391 (2001); John 
Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social 
Constructivist Challenge, 52 INT’L ORG. 855 (1998); Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is What States 
Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics, 46 INT’L ORG. 391 (1992). 
 5. For elaboration of the history of this debate, see Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations 
Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2615–34 (1997). 
101805 04_KOH.DOC 12/12/2005  3:15 PM 
2005]   INTERNALIZATION THROUGH SOCIALIZATION 977 
approach gets past the question usually asked by first-generation 
international law and international relations scholars—namely, “Does 
international law matter?”—and instead brings the microscope into 
sharper focus, asking, “Given that international law matters, what are 
the social mechanisms that help make international law matter?” 
Goodman and Jinks then recognize that the mechanics of social 
influence have so far been grossly underspecified in the literature. In 
their view, we must start studying not just the macroprocesses, but 
also the social mechanisms that actually govern the social influence of 
law, i.e., the microprocesses of social influence that affect what I have 
elsewhere called “norm-internalization.”6 In short, their piece is a 
case study in internalization through socialization. 
By refocusing the inquiry, Goodman and Jinks bring a new 
dimension to the study of the anatomy of social influence: 
identification of “patterns of acculturation.”7 Their article usefully 
makes clear that chosen social mechanisms are distinct from 
methodological orientations. Some constructivists emphasize 
coercion; some rationalists emphasize persuasion. Thus, the 
traditional coercion-persuasion dichotomy invoked by both realists 
and constructivists really masks a trichotomy that includes a third 
way—patterns of acculturation, or societal pressures upon a state to 
assimilate with a higher normative standard. 
By focusing on acculturation over coercion and persuasion, 
Goodman and Jinks place themselves squarely in the constructivist 
camp, talking about how preferences form and change through a 
complex interaction between process and ideas. As significantly, their 
study of social mechanisms requires the importation of a new 
discipline—not political science and international relations, which 
have traditionally been the social sciences applied to international 
legal studies—but Law and Sociology, a field in which both of these 
scholars have advanced degrees. Their work thus imports into 
interdisciplinary work in international relations a new literature that 
has not previously been much read or invoked by international law 
scholars, namely the New Institutional Theory of organizations, 
pioneered by such sociology scholars as Professors Paul DiMaggio, 
Woody Powell, John Meyer, and Lynne Zucker.8 
 
 6. Id. at 2646. 
 7. Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International 
Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 638 (2004). 
 8. See generally sources cited in Goodman & Jinks, id. at 626–27 n.9. 
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Goodman and Jinks’s law-and-sociology approach leads them to 
the broader notion of world policy institutionalism described in their 
Stanford Law Review paper, a theory rooted in the sociology of 
organizations. That theory asks why nation-states end up identifying 
with a referent group and trying to keep up with a community 
standard in global affairs.9 Their sustained examination of this 
question leads them toward an as-yet underdeveloped, but potentially 
promising, sociological model of state sovereignty, which sees the 
state not as a monolith, but as an institutionalized organizational form 
embedded in global cultural order. Thus, the approach sees the 
globalization of human rights as an aspect of the broader 
globalization of culture and language, which, as much as particular 
ideas, has the potential to define and redefine the legitimate purposes 
of the nation-state. 
In one sense, Goodman and Jinks’s approach is not new. Their 
broader world polity model has close familial ties to the English 
“international society” school of Grotian heritage.10 Like the 
American constructivists, the British “international society” scholars 
see the norms, values, and social structure of international society as 
helping to form the identity of, and then to acculturate the national 
actors who operate within, that international society. Nations thus 
obey international rules not just because of sophisticated calculations 
about how compliance or noncompliance will affect their interests, 
but because a repeated habit of obedience within a societal setting 
socializes them and remakes their interests so that they come to value 
 
 9. Goodman & Jinks, supra n. 1. 
 10. HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY 13, 28–33 (1977): 
[I]f states today form an international society . . . this is because, recognising certain 
common interests and perhaps common values, they regard themselves as bound by 
certain rules in their dealings with one another . . . . [and] co-operate in the working 
of institutions such as the forms of procedures of international law, the machinery of 
diplomacy and general international organisation, and the customs and conventions 
of war. 
For other writings in this vein, see generally ADAM WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF 
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1992); MARTIN WIGHT, Collected Lectures of Martin Wight on 
International Theory at the London School of Economics, in INTERNATIONAL THEORY: THE 
THREE TRADITIONS (Gabriele Wight & Brian Porter eds., 1992); Barry Buzan, From 
International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the 
English School, 47 INT’L ORG. 327 (1993); Andrew Hurrell, International Society and the Study 
of Regimes: A Reflective Approach, in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 49 
(Volker Rittberger ed., 1993); James Mayall, International Society and International Theory, in 
THE REASON OF STATES: A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL THEORY 122 (Michael 
Donelan ed., 1978). 
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rule compliance. In Andrew Hurrell’s words, “[A] good deal of the 
compliance pull of international rules derives from the relationship 
between individual rules and the broader pattern of international 
relations: states follow specific rules, even when inconvenient, 
because they have a longer-term interest in the maintenance of law-
impregnated international community.”11  
Nevertheless, the Goodman and Jinks approach charts several 
new directions beyond their distinctive choice of a sociological 
methodology. First, although this particular paper is not empirical, 
their argument can be tested as part of an emerging wave of empirical 
scholarship in international law and international relations.12 Second, 
they focus not on the traditional subject matter of international 
law/international relations—international trade—but, rather, on the 
more thorny topic of human rights. Human rights has traditionally 
been the toughest case study for interdisciplinary theory because 
compliance with international human rights rules cannot easily be 
explained as reciprocity or by reference to a larger cooperation or 
coordination game. Moreover, human rights is the subject matter area 
in international affairs where the largest enforcement deficit exists, 
inasmuch as the costs of enforcement appear high and the benefits 
seem low by traditional state interest calculations. Third and finally, 
Goodman and Jinks start an important process of looking not just at 
channels of influence, but at broader questions of regime design13—
membership, rule precision, and enforcement and monitoring 
mechanisms. They suggest that if acculturation and not coercion is the 
main approach to social influence, then “hard” mechanisms of social 
influence are not necessarily more effective in securing compliance 
than softer norms.  
If these are the virtues of the emerging Goodman-Jinks project, in 
what ways can their project be strengthened? First, they need to test 
their approach against many more contemporary concrete examples, 
not just historical examples of the kind usefully suggested by José 
 
 11. Hurrell, supra note 10, at 59. 
 12. See generally Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights 
Treaties, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 171 (2003) (critiquing Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make 
a Difference?, infra); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 
YALE L.J. 1935 (2002) (presenting the results of empirical research on the effectiveness of 
human rights treaties); Oona A. Hathaway, Testing Conventional Wisdom, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
185 (2003). 
 13. Such scholars as Oona Hathaway, Andrew Guzman, and Kal Raustiala have begun 
looking into regime design questions as well. 
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Alvarez.14 For example, they could study the success of their theory of 
state socialization along a spectrum of states: from North Korea, to 
Libya, to China, to Turkey, to the post-September 11 United States. 
Each of these countries presents a differing level of community 
participation and a differing degree of issue linkage, in some cases 
contractual, in other cases community-based. Instead of treating all 
nation-states as standing at a comparable stage of national evolution, 
the Goodman-Jinks model should distinguish among different 
national agendas for global legitimation through human rights 
compliance. North Korea is a prime example of an extraordinarily 
isolated country that barely participates in the international 
community. To the extent that it can be socialized, this socialization 
must begin through quid-pro-quo contractual issue linkages—for 
example, the trading of food and energy for reduction of nuclear 
production and specific human rights improvements. A country such 
as Libya presents a developing example of a previously isolated 
country that the United States is now seeking to socialize into 
international norms through a broad array of emerging issue linkages.  
By contrast, countries such as China and Turkey, each of which 
exhibit serious human rights abuses, also display increasing degrees of 
community participation. Turkey, for example, must comply with 
European human rights norms as a condition of joining the regional 
economic community, and China is entering the global economic 
community—symbolized by membership in the World Trade 
Organization—without yet having acceded fully to the global human 
rights agenda. Thus, these different states seek socialization and 
legitimation for different reasons: North Korea, in an effort to 
eliminate its pariah status; Turkey and China, in an effort to promote 
community acceptance; and the United States, out of a desire to 
promote a broader global leadership agenda.15  
What Goodman and Jinks should clarify is that, at base, their 
third way—acculturation—is really an intermediate way between 
coercion and persuasion—a form of incomplete internalization that 
results from incomplete persuasion. Anyone who parents a teenage 
child quickly learns that between norm acceptance and norm 
 
 14. José E. Alvarez, Do States Socialize?, 54 DUKE L.J. 961 (2005). 
 15. For a discussion of the different incentives of North Korea, Iraq, and the United States 
within the global human rights system, see generally Harold Hongju Koh, Jefferson Memorial 
Lecture: Transnational Legal Process After September 11th, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 337 (2004); 
Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479 (2003). 
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compliance is a large zone that can be thought of a zone of “norm 
conformity.” In any close-knit community there are intense, internally 
felt pressures to conform and thereby to reduce a community 
member’s discomfort level at being a visible outlier. In this zone, the 
motives for conformity are complex. A form of “human rights 
covering” occurs, in which countries and leaders accede to the 
pressures to acculturate out of a combination of norm acceptance, 
conformity, and self-interest. For example, the recent debacle of U.S. 
torture at Abu Ghraib triggered a range of American responses that 
combined to create a national incentive to conform. But those 
responses were themselves varied, ranging from those who were 
morally offended by the acts, to those who were disturbed by the 
harm to America’s international reputation, to those who were more 
outraged by the outrage against Abu Ghraib than by Abu Ghraib 
itself. In moving toward an integrated, mutually reinforcing model of 
social mechanisms, Goodman and Jinks would do well to introduce 
more dynamic elements, tracking the evolution of a state’s norm-
internalization from coercion to persuasion to internal acceptance. 
These are not distinct alternatives, but rather, stages in an 
evolutionary process, whereby persuasion often occurs in the shadow 
of coercion, and acculturation often occurs in the shadow of 
persuasion.  
In this evolutionary process, moments of political transition are 
important in ways that Goodman and Jinks do not fully address. 
Countries that have converted to human rights acceptance tend to be 
“more Catholic than the pope,” as illustrated, for example, by the role 
of Nelson Mandela in South Africa, Vaclav Havel in the Czech 
Republic, and Kim Dae Jung in South Korea. 
Goodman and Jinks also have yet to develop the details of their 
discussion of domestic channels of influence, explaining, for example, 
how a society can move from a textual internalization of international 
norms (for example, in the U.S.-occupation-influenced Iraqi 
constitution) to “internalization on the ground,” in the sense of 
genuine social acceptance of human rights norms (what I call 
elsewhere the process of “social internalization”).16 Their model also 
unduly emphasizes positive treaty law over unwritten customary law 
and makes insufficient use of the notion of an “interpretive 
 
 16. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International 
Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623 (1998) (describing the difference between legal, social, and 
political internalization). 
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community,” in which the meaning of global norms can be debated 
and refined through the interaction of external and internal 
interpreters.17 
Still, their paper is important and their long-term project is only 
beginning. In a brief time, the collaboration between these two 
energetic and talented young scholars has been both productive and 
stimulating. This promising start bodes well for their contribution 
together in the years to come.18 
 
 17. Id. at 649–51 (discussing the concept of interpretive community). 
 18. See generally Goodman & Jinks, supra notes 1, 7, & 12; Ryan Goodman & Derek P. 
Jinks, Filartiga’s Firm Footing: International Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 
FORDHAM L. REV. 463 (1997). 
